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Quantum computing offers the possibility of massively parallel computing that 
scales to large problems in a way not possible for classical computers. It also may make 
possible rapid and secure forms of communication that are not possible with classical 
devices. As an offshoot of the quantum computing literature, a small set of papers has 
started to examine quantum games. The question naturally arises: what if anything does 
quantum game theory have for economists? This brief note attempt to summarize the 
sometimes impenetrable notation used in quantum physics. I argue that quantum games 
fall within the existing framework of correlated equilibrium, cheap-talk equilibrium and 
mechanism  design  theory,  where  the  correlation  and/or  communication  devices  are 
limited in a way not terribly relevant to economic theory. The notation is taken from 
Cleve et al [2004], and interpreted using the Wikipedia. 
A quantum mechanical system has a state  ￿ , which is simply a ￿ -dimensional 
complex valued row vector of unit length. The notation  ￿  refers to the conjugate of 
￿ ,  that  is,  the  transposed  ￿ -dimensional  column  vector  consisting  of  complex 
conjugates of  ￿ . Since the length of a complex vector is the square root of the inner 
product of that vector with its conjugate, the condition that the state has unit length is 
simply  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  A  complex  ￿ ￿ ￿   matrix  ￿   is  positive  semi-definite  if 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for all complex ￿ -vectors  ￿ . A measurement system consists of a finite 
collection ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of ￿ ￿ ￿  complex positive semi-definite matrices, where ￿ ￿ ￿ , a finite 
set, and  
  ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ , 
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where ￿  is the identity matrix. When the measurement system is applied to the state  ￿ , 
the probability that the measurement takes on the value ￿ is imply  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
Quantum physicists also have their own notation for canonical bases of complex 
￿ -space. Suppose the underlying classical state has two components each of which can 
take on two values ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿. Then the quantum state has four dimensions, corresponding to 
each of the four classical states  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ and reflecting the value of the first and 
second  component.  Then  the  canonical  basis  of  complex  4-space,  which  we  would 
usually write as ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ would be written by a physicist 
as  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.  Complex  vectors  are  then  written  as  linear  combinations  of 
these  basis  vectors,  so  for  example  ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,  which  of 
course has unit length. 
  Next we suppose that there are two players. These players have access to a  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
dimensional state  ￿ . A measurement system for player ￿ consists of a finite collection 
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   complex  positive  semi-definite  matrices.  The  Kronecker 
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which may be familiar to economists from seemingly unrelated regression theory where 
Kronecker products frequently appear in covariance matrices. When both players apply 
their measurements, and the state is  ￿ , the probability of the pair of measurements 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   is  given  by  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Since  the  probability  of  player  1s 
measurement  depends  on  the  measurement  taken  by  player  2,  this  is  referred  to  in 
quantum mechanics as quantum entanglement. It should be emphasized that although this 
is rarely explicitly stated in the quantum game literature, it is assumed that the underlying 
state  ￿   is  common  knowledge  among  the  players,  although  of  course,  the  realized 
value of measurements based on that state is not known. 
  We now consider a game in which the pure strategy spaces are  ￿ ￿  for player ￿  
the outcome of quantum mechanical measurement, in other words, will correspond to a 
choice of strategy for that player. Payoffs are real valued  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where as usual  ￿ ￿￿  
refers to the strategy of the player other than player  ￿. However, in a quantum game,   3
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corresponds to the pure strategy ￿; this is ordinarily assumed to be in the feasible set. 
More generally 
  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
corresponds to the mixed strategy that plays ￿  with probability  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . These also should 
be feasible. But quantum games may allow other non-classical measurement systems as 
well    and  indeed,  even  if  a  player  plays  a  classical  pure  or  mixed  strategy,  an 
opponent through quantum entanglement may be able to correlate play with that player. 
  At this point the literature on quantum games faces a modeling decision, although 
they do not recognize it as such. In one model, players make their measurements, then 
decide what to do based on the measurement. In this case, we may think of the result of 
the measurement as a recommendation on how to play. We then define an equilibrium to 
be  a  pair  of  measurement  systems  such  that  each  player  knowing  her  opponents 
measurement system finds it optimal to follow the recommendation made by her own 
system.  In  this  case,  it  should  be  apparent  that  an  equilibrium  is  a  special  case  of  a 
correlated  equilibrium    all  that  matters  to  player  is  the  joint  distribution  of 
recommendations over strategy profiles  that this is generated by a quantum mechanical 
system is not relevant to incentives. This point was first made in Meyer [2004]. 
However,  the  quantum  game  literature  has  taken  two  different  turns.  One 
possibility that is considered is that players have private information prior to submitting 
their  measurements.  Consider,  for  example,  the  pure  coordination  game  examined  by 
Cleve et al. In the variant described by Dahl and Landsburg [2005] Alice and Bob each 
independently with 50-50 probability are asked either Do you like cats? or Do you 
like dogs? If they agree they both get one, unless both are asked Do you like cats? in 
which  case  they  get  one  if  they  disagree.  Otherwise  they  get  0.  After  receiving  the 
question,  they  then  submit  their  measurements  to  the  quantum  device,  get  their 
recommendation on whether to say yes or no and submit either answer they prefer to 
receive their payoff. In any Nash, and moreover, in any correlated equilibrium, of the   4
game they can win at most ¾ of the time. If they use a particular quantum device to 
coordinate their actions, Cleve et al show that they win  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of the time. A 
similar example was previously described by La Mura [2003]. The key point here is the 
players are implicitly allowed to send messages (measurements) to a machine that then 
gives them advice. This is not an example of a correlated equilibrium: it is an example of 
a cheap-talk equilibrium.  If we can design an arbitrary cheap talk device to which 
players  can  submit  messages  and  get  advice,  they  can  win  all the time. Each simply 
announces the question they were asked, and if they were both asked about cats, Alice 
says no and Bob yes otherwise they both say yes. This is of course the basic point 
of the cheap talk literature going back to the early work of Crawford and Sobel [1982] 
and Farrell [1987]. This particular branch of the quantum tree has simply rediscovered 
cheap talk. 
 These  examples  do,  however,  give  an  indication  of  just  how  complicated 
quantum  mechanics  can  be  even  in  the  simplest  problem    the  Dahl  and  Landsburg 
[2005] version of the example asserts on page 1 that quantum probabilities violate the 
ordinary  laws  of  probability    something  which  the  fact  that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  should persuade you is not true. They then continue on to analyze on 
p. 4 the cats and dogs example  mixing the usual laws of probability with the supposed 
quantum laws. 
The La Mura [2003] example is instructive.
3 In that example each player is one of 
three  types  A,B  and  C  with  equal  probability  of  1/3
rd.  Each  chooses  one  of  three 
measurements,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Because of the quantum entanglement, if they choose the same 
measuring device, then the probabilities they are told to say yes, no are given by 
 
  “yes”  “no” 
“yes”  0  1/2 
“no”  1/2  0 
 
while if they choose different measuring devices the probabilities are 
 
                                                 
3 I am grateful to Pierfrancesco La Mura for explaining this to me.   5
  “yes”  “no” 
“yes”  3/8  1/8 
“no”  1/8  3/8 
 
Of course, we can implement this scheme with a classical communications device that 
receives the messages  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  from the players and replies by advising them according to 
these probabilities. Note that there is no issue of classical versus quantum laws of 
probability here. 
The point that deserves some emphasis, however, is that not all communications 
devices can be implemented by quantum correlating devices. In the La Mura example 
suppose that type A chooses ￿ , type B chooses ￿  and type C chooses ￿ . Then a player 1 
with type A faces the following probabilities 
 
  A  B  C 
  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no 
yes  0  4/8  3/8  1/8  3/8  1/8 
no  4/8  0  1/8  3/8  1/8  3/8 
 
where opponents of each type have probability of 1/3
rd. The goal of this game is to avoid 
agreeing with the same type, and to agree with different types. This scheme accomplishes 
that    if  the  advice  is  followed  and  the  opponent  is  also  type  A  the  probability  of 
agreement is 0. On the other hand, if the opponent is type B or C the probability of 
agreement is 3/8. But notice the following fact: given the message (yes, for example) 
received by player 1, the conditional probability of each type of opponent remains 1/3
rd.
4 
In this sense no communication takes place. This is fundamental to quantum mechanics  
by simply entangling states, no communication in this sense can ever take place. That is, 
based on quantum entanglement, a players measurement may not reveal anything about 
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fundamental in that a players signal may contain information about what signal his opponent received. For 
example, it they are both restricted to use the same device, then each players signal reveals exactly what 
signal his opponent received.   6
what measurement device the other player used.
5 It may, however, reveal information 
about the signal received by the other player introducing a correlation, or may reveal 
information about the joint distribution of the measurement device and the signal, as it 
does  in  this  example:  physicists  sometimes  refer  to  this  as  pseudo-communication. 
Note that quantum pseudo-communication may have advantages of security; or may be 
available when other true communication devices are not, in which case the quantum 
constraints become relevant. 
There  is  second  branch  of  quantum  games,  which  does  not  consider  private 
information, but is focused instead on solving games with dominant strategies such as the 
Prisoners Dilemma. Benjamin and Hayden [2001] is an example of such a model. Since 
it  is  obvious  that  after  you  get  your  recommendation,  regardless  of  what  quantum 
principles may be involved in making it, it is still best to follow your dominant strategy. 
So  they  assume  (implicitly)  that  following  the  recommendation  of  the  device  is  not 
optional, but is rather a binding commitment. The only way to make sense of this is to 
assume that the results of player measurements do not go back to the players, but rather 
go  to  a  machine  that  then  implements  the  decisions.  But  if  we  are  going  to  build  a 
machine that takes input from players and makes choices on their behalf, we are by no 
means limited to the simplistic machines considered in the quantum games literature. 
Indeed, the problem of building machines to make choices based on player submissions is 
exactly the problem considered in the mechanism design literature. So it should not be 
surprising,  for  example,  that  it  might  be  possible  to  get  cooperation  in  a  quantum 
prisoners  dilemma  game.  If  we  are  allowed  to  build  machines,  a  simple  machine 
consistent with players original strategy spaces is to add a single strategy Z. If a player 
plays a strategy in the original space, then the machine implements that action for her. If 
she chooses Z and her opponent chooses Z, then the machine assigns both to cooperate. If 
she chooses Z and her opponents does not, then the machine assigns her to defect. It is 
obvious that Z weakly dominates all other strategies in this mechanism. 
While at the moment economists may have little to learn from quantum games, 
there  are  legitimate  issues  that  the  literature  may  address  in  the  future:  for  example, 
quantum  correlation  devices  may  impose  limitations  on  the  feasible  set  of  correlated 
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equilibria while offering levels of security not attainable by classical devices. Or it may 
be that in modeling evolution at the molecular level, quantum devices play an important 
correlating role. 
For further reading on quantum games oriented towards economists and game 
theorists, Campos [2005] has a nice exposition. 
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